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Leveling the Playing Field in the EU, NAFTA, CAN, Mercosur and Beyond:
 Comparing the Role of Competition Rules in Regional Economic Organizations


I. The Role of Competition Rules in the European Union.

Competition (antitrust) policy is one of the most fundamental policies underlying the European Community because of its relationship to the original overarching goals of the Community to create a European common market in which distinct national markets give way to the “Single Market.” While this may come as a surprise to those familiar with the large role played by cartels in the industrialization of Europe,​[1]​ the emphasis on competition rules followed from the decartelization of Germany during the Allied occupation following the Second World War.  When the “Schuman Plan” for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952-2002) (“ECSC”) was presented to U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, on May 7, 1950, Acheson’s first reaction was fear that the plan was a clever cover for a “gigantic European cartel.”​[2]​
The German Cartel Law followed the aforementioned ECSC Treaty and its broader counterpart, the EC Treaty. Jean Monnet, first President of the ECSC’s High Authority, described the antitrust provisions of the ECSC Treaty by stating that, “For Europe, they were a fundamental innovation: the extensive antitrust legislation now applied by the European Community essentially derives from those few lines in the Schuman Treaty.”​[3]​ The competition provisions of the EC Treaty closely follow the ECSC Treaty and bear the substantive imprint of the Sherman Act derived from their American ancestry. ​[4]​ Moreover, the gradual expansion of the European Community has thus spread the competition rules derived from Robert Bowie’s “few lines in the Schuman Treaty” to many more countries.
The now-expired European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (1952-2002) was of limited scope but nonetheless laid the single market groundwork for the more expansive European Community Treaty.  Competition policy was seen by the then-High Authority (now the Commission of the European Community) as integral to this objective, as was noted in an early policy memorandum:

		A genuine single market cannot be brought about except through free competition.  If the market were to remain subject to the arbitrary decisions of the cartels, or to the restrictive practices of monopolies, then the benefits of the single market would soon be offset by the effects of price-fixing and production quotas.  This of course was understood by the framers of the [ECSC] Treaty, who provided in Articles 65 and 66 a set of standards and guiding procedural principles which together constitute the first effective anti-trust law in Europe.  (There is a resemblance to American models here.  Article 65, which relates to combinations in restraint of trade, and Article 66, which relates to illegal concentrations of economic power, respectively correspond somewhat to Articles 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.)​[5]​

In the EC, it has often been said that the “first principle” of competition law is single market integration and the elimination of private practices which interfere with integration.​[6]​  As Deringer has commented, “the basic sin in Europe is not so much restricting competition but creating an obstacle to integration.”​[7]​  Competition law serves the purpose of European integration by preventing private concerns from erecting or maintaining private barriers to free trade after or as governmental barriers are dismantled under the Treaty of Rome.​[8]​  As Faull put it, “the EC's overriding objective of prising open national markets … is not the invisible hand; it is competition policy as can opener.”​[9]​
While more recent documents have placed more emphasis on maintenance of competitive markets as the first objective of EC competition policy​[10]​ and seemingly demoted the single market objective to second place, there is no doubt that both are important.  Because the Community welcomed ten new members in 2004 and expects two to three more in 2007, the single market objective may well take on renewed importance.  Many of the new Member States and candidates for EU membership are former Communist states to whom “free market”​[11]​ has been a pejorative term for most of the decades since the close of World War II.  The new Member States frequently are also new market economies in which those former state-owned industries which have survived the collapse of the Soviet Union are often dominant in the national markets.  The challenges of creation of a single market free of distortions and restrictions of competition in the context of ten new members are arguably comparable to if not greater than those which faced the Six in 1952 and 1958.


II.  The Role of Competition Rules in NAFTA
	The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is comprised of the United States, Mexico, and Canada.  The NAFTA agreement itself confines its antitrust and competition provisions to the five articles of Chapter 15.​[12]​  With the exception of provisions governing the behavior of state monopolies, the NAFTA agreement does not dictate substantive competition or antitrust rules, but merely obligates the Parties to have such rules.  In the case of the United States, the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) and the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914) and Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) meant that the U.S. had already had such rules for over one hundred years.
	In the case of Canada,​[13]​ its first federal competition law (1888) actually predated the Sherman Act, although its current competition law,​[14]​ quite close in some respects to the U.S. antitrust laws, dates from 1976 as amended, all  of which substantially predate NAFTA ,of course.  Mexico, on the other hand, while it had general proscriptions of monopolies and restraints in its Constitution of 1917​[15]​ and 1934 Monopolies law,​[16]​ had the form of competition law without the substance.  The law was difficult to apply, enforcement was scant and politicized, and the government itself was such a dominant force in the economy as supplier and purchaser of goods as well as direct price regulator that the law had little if any effect.  However, in contemplation of the coming into force of NAFTA and as part of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s economic reforms intended to make free competition Mexico’s primary engine of economic growth, a new Federal Economic Competition Law (LFCE)​[17]​ was adopted in December, 1992, effective in June, 1993 in time for the entry into force of NAFTA on January 1, 1994.
	NAFTA (Art. 1504) establishes a Working Group on Trade and Competition to consider further the development of competition rules and in particular the relationships between competition and trade.  NAFTA thus obligates the parties to have competition laws and to apply them without discrimination, but does not impose new uniform competition law on the parties in the same way that the Articles 81 and 82, et.al., of the EC Treaty do with respect to the Member States.  NAFTA also lacks the institutions of the EU, as well as the political and security objectives of the EU.​[18]​
NAFTA is merely a free trade area, not a customs union or a common market.  There is no NAFTA competition enforcement agency, no NAFTA Court of Justice, no NAFTA executive comparable to the EC Commission, and no NAFTA Parliament.  There is a binding dispute settlement process involving multilateral panels, but the competition provisions of Art. 1501 are expressly excluded from the dispute settlement procedures by the provisions of Art. 1501(3).  The assumption is undoubtedly that the Working Group will ultimately result in more precise rules, but this has not yet occurred.
	NAFTA thus provides at most a bare framework for the development of cooperative or collective competition policies, at least in comparison to the EU.  However, the reason for having any provisions for competition policy in the agreement echoes the reasoning of the EU: to prevent governmental trade barriers from being replaced by private trade restraints, as noted by an American Bar Association Task Force:​[19]​
	First, competition policy and trade policy go hand in hand in providing fundamental economic underpinnings of market economies, notwithstanding significant derogations from these policies.  Just as free trade measures lift government barriers to trade, competition law enforcement can eliminate private barriers to trade.  Second, as trade becomes freer, private and national incentives to block trade and protect traditional markets may become stronger; a competition policy to prevent rebuilding barriers by anticompetitive restraints becomes more imperative.

III. The Role of Competition Rules in Mercosur and CAN.
The Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur) was created by the Agreement of Asuncion on March 16, 1991. Mercosur´s member countries are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The main provisions related to competition policy are in the Decision 17/96 of December 17, 1996 containing the Protocol of the Defense of Competition in Mercosur.​[20]​   The Mercosur Protocol  establishes a common regime of  substantive rules for each of the member countries, prohibiting those trade practices that limit, restrict, affect or distort competition in the sub-regional market, including, specifically, the horizontal practices derived from collusive agreements between competing enterprises, practices that constitute the abuse of a dominant position, as well as economic concentrations arising from the merger, acquisition or the creation of enterprises as a whole.  However, unlike the EU, these rules are not automatically binding in the member countries but require national legislation to incorporate these rules into the domestic legal systems, making the rule “directly applicable,” to borrow the EU terminology.  This has not yet happened.  Although the Protocol entered into force in 2000, and regulations for the application of the competition provisions were agreed in 2002, the regulations are not yet in force.  It appears that the Protocol is still pending congressional approval by each member country to be enforceable as national law.  
Although Mercosur styles itself as a common market, it is only a customs union at this point.  The common market aspect of Mercosur in not projected to come into force before January 1, 2006, and perhaps not even then.  Moreover, Mercosur to this point, like NAFTA, has lacked the supranational law and institutions of the EC (or even the CAN) although it was proposed in the Olivos Protocol (2002) that a supranational Mercosur court (“Permanent Tribunal of Review”) modeled after the CAN court and the EC Court of Justice be created.​[21]​ As Bernieri notes,
For some years now, Mercosur experts have been pushing for the creation of a permanent court following the Andean example. Under the terms of the Cartagena Agreement, the Andean Court settles differences that arise among the countries with regard to the fulfillment of Community commitments, controls the operation of bodies like the Andean Commission or the General Secretariat to ensure that they do not exceed their given functions and backs national judges when the latter must implement or interpret the System’s provisions.
The wording of the Olivos Protocol, whereby the political bodies of Mercosur agreed to create their permanent court, reveals just how deeply our neighbors were inspired by the Quito Court. The stated aims of the Mercosur Protocol are to "depoliticize disputes among the Members, give them a measure of institutional predictability and advance toward a uniform interpretation of Mercosur’s body of law and the creation of a common jurisprudence."​[22]​
Even the Olivos Protocol “Permanent Tribunal,” despite its name, is transitional, intended to be replaced by a Permanent Dispute Resolution System before the implementation of the common market.  Nonetheless, when ratified and implementing regulations are agreed and put into force, there will be substantial improvement over the previous transitional system:
The most important innovation of the Protocol of Olivos is the establishment of a Permanent Tribunal of Review that is designed to “guarantee the correct interpretation, application and fulfillment of the fundamental instruments of the integration process”
and MERCOSUR norms “in a consistent and systematic manner.” The Permanent Tribunal of Review will have the power to “confirm, modify or revoke the legal basis and decisions” of an ad hoc arbitral panel and the Tribunal’s decisions take precedence
over those of the ad hoc body.   Furthermore, state parties may request review by the Permanent Tribunal of Review of any dispute that falls within its subject matter  jurisdiction if they are unable to resolve fully the matter through direct negotiations
(bypassing the Common Market Group and ad hoc arbitration). Finally, the Common Market Council is authorized to establish regulations permitting advisory opinions from the Tribunal.​[23]​
In sum, Mercosur has not really implemented its “common” competition rules, distinct from applications of national rules by member countries.  Assuming Mercosur successfully proceeds with its planned implementation of a common market, it may be that this situation will be improved.
The Andean Community (CAN), or the Andean Group was created by the Cartagena Agreement of May 26, 1969 and thus as an organization substantially predates both NAFTA and Mercosur. The CAN member countries are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. The provisions regarding competition policy are found in Decision 285: Norms for Prevention or Correction of Distortions in Competition Caused by Practices that Restrict Free Competition of March 21, 1991.​[24]​
	Unlike Mercosur, CAN has created and relied on supranational institutions and law.  The CAN has created a Commission, a Council, a Parliament,​[25]​ and a Court of Justice.  Decisions of these institutions are binding on the member countries, Community decisions have supremacy and are directly applicable.​[26]​  The target date for implementing the common market is 2005.  A review of the competition rules of the CAN alongside those of the EU confirm that CAN is closest to the EU model in terms of supranationality, institutions, and competition rules.  Assuming completion of the common market, the resemblance may grow.
IV. Conclusion:  NAFTA, CAN, Mercosur and Beyond.
	The EU has been developing its competition rules for over fifty years, and represents a mature competition system as well as the most comprehensive effort at economic, monetary and perhaps political integration of the regional organizations discussed.  As recently as May 1, 2004 the EU admitted 10 new Member States and simultaneously put into force new competition regulations that among other things devolved some enforcement responsibility to the Member States and at the same time centralized the European Commission’s control over competition policy, including provisions that the Member States must apply EC competition rules in any case involving trade among the Member States and that conflicting national competition rules may not be applied.​[27]​  The new EC legislation​[28]​ also requires the Member States give their national competition authorities power to enforce EC competition rules, so that the European Commission and all 25 Member States, as well as private litigants in the national courts collectively will be engaged in a higher level of enforcement activity.  It will be interesting to see in the regional economic organizations of Latin and South America follow this lead.
	It is apparent from the discussion above that NAFTA and Mercosur fall well short of the EU and even CAN on the degree of regional integration in general and competition rules in particular.  NAFTA is not intended to be more than a free trade area, Mercosur is as yet an imperfect customs union although it still has a common market as its goal, and even CAN is not yet a common market.  The integration process has moved slowly, perhaps even moreso than the early years of the EU, but it seems that these organizations now perceive that the solution is deeper economic integration rather than less.  Competition rules should become more important, not less important, as integration deepens and reliance on supranational institutions increases.
	The widening of integration in Latin and South American is also scheduled to receive a boost.  Although the prospects now appear dim for a successful EU-Mercosur free trade area agreement, it appears that the EU and CAN are moving towards a possible association agreement which would include a free trade agreement.  While there have been significant efforts to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, the outcome of the Miami meetings in late 2003 suggests that this may not be accomplished.
	Nonetheless, December 16, 2003 saw the signing of an “Economic Complementary Agreement between CAN and Mercosur, including a free trade agreement, thus joining those two blocs in a free trade area.  That agreement and a free trade agreement between Mercosur and Peru were effective January 1, 2005.  However, December, 2004 saw the Cusco Declaration in which Mercosur, CAN, Chile, Guyana and Suriname announced the formation of the South American Community of Nations, (SAC—South American Community) a new and greatly expanded regional organization intended to build upon the integration achievements of CAN and Mercosur.  The Secretary General of CAN described the project thusly:
	When the Cusco Presidential Declaration is signed, the South American Community of Nations will become the fifth ranking world power, with a GDP of one trillion dollars; and the fourth in population, with 361 million inhabitants; and will cover an area of over 17 million km2.
****
         The South American Community will take shape from the progressive dovetailing of the CAN and MERCOSUR, with the addition of Chile. Guyana and Suriname, also South American nations, will be associated with the process. Regional organizations like the LAIA, ACTO and SELA will contribute, as well. 
  
This means that we will not start from scratch, but will build on existing strengths, like the two subregional integration processes that, within the South American sphere, must progressively harmonize and resize their legal system and programs through the joint efforts of their bodies and institutions.​[29]​
 	It is much too soon to see what will come of this tremendously ambitious project.  However, it seems likely that as the SAC looks to widen and deepen economic integration in South America, the lessons of the EU, including competition policy, are likely to play a significant role. This is especially likely because the organization most like the EU, CAN, will play a leading role through its established supranational institutions.  As Director General Wagner noted, ​[30]​
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^12	   NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)1
CHAPTER FIFTEEN: COMPETITION POLICY, MONOPOLIES AND STATE ENTERPRISES Article 1501: Competition Law 1. Each Party shall adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anticompetitive business conduct and take appropriate action with respect thereto, recognizing that such measures will enhance the fulfillment of the objectives of this Agreement. To this end the Parties shall consult from time to time about the effectiveness of measures undertaken by each Party. 

2. Each Party recognizes the importance of cooperation and coordination among their authorities to further effective competition law enforcement in the free trade area. The Parties shall cooperate on issues of competition law enforcement policy, including mutual legal assistance, notification, consultation and exchange of information relating to the enforcement of competition laws and policies in the free trade area. 

3. No Party may have recourse to dispute settlement under this Agreement for any matter arising under this Article. Article 1502: Monopolies and State Enterprises 1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from designating a monopoly. 
 
2. Where a Party intends to designate a monopoly and the designation may affect the interests of persons of another Party, the Party shall: wherever possible, provide prior written notification to the other Party of the designation; and endeavor to introduce at the time of the designation such conditions on the operation of the monopoly as will minimize or eliminate any nullification or impairment of benefits in the sense of Annex 2004
(Nullification and Impairment). 3. Each Party shall ensure, through regulatory control, administrative supervision or the application of other measures, that any privately owned monopoly that it designates and any government monopoly that it maintains or designates: acts in a manner that is not inconsistent with the Party's obligations under this Agreement wherever such a monopoly exercises any regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority that the Party has delegated to it in connection with the monopoly good or service, such as the power to grant import or export licenses, approve commercial transactions or impose quotas, fees or other charges; except to comply with any terms of its designation that are not inconsistent with subparagraph (c) or (d), acts solely in accordance with commercial considerations in its purchase or sale of the monopoly good or service in the relevant market, including with regard to price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other terms and conditions of purchase or sale; provides non-discriminatory treatment to investments of investors, to goods and to service providers of another Party in its purchase or sale of the monopoly good or service in the relevant market; and does not use its monopoly position to engage, either directly or indirectly, including through its dealings with its parent, its subsidiary or other enterprise with common ownership, in anticompetitive practices in a non-monopolized market in its territory that adversely affect an investment of an investor of another Party, including through the discriminatory provision of the monopoly good or service, cross subsidization or predatory conduct. 4. Paragraph 3 does not apply to procurement by governmental agencies of goods or services for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods or the provision of services for commercial sale. 5. For purposes of this Article "maintain" means designate prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement and existing on January 1, 1994. Article 1503: State Enterprises 1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from maintaining or establishing a state enterprise. 

2 .Each Party shall ensure, through regulatory control, administrative supervision or the application of other measures, that any state enterprise that it maintains or establishes acts in a manner that is not inconsistent with the Party's obligations under Chapters Eleven (Investment) and Fourteen (Financial Services) wherever such enterprise exercises any regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority that the Party has delegated to it, such as the power to expropriate, grant licenses, approve commercial transactions or impose quotas, fees or other charges. 

3.  Each Party shall ensure that any state enterprise that it maintains or establishes accords non-discriminatory treatment in the sale of its goods or services to investments in the Party's territory of investors of another Party. Article 1504: Working Group on Trade and Competition The Commission shall establish a Working Group on Trade and Competition, comprising representatives of each Party, to report, and to make recommendations on further work as appropriate, to the Commission within five years of the date of entry into force of this Agreement on relevant issues concerning the relationship between competition laws and policies and trade in the free trade area. Article 1505: Definitions For purposes of this Chapter: 
designate means to establish, designate or authorize, or to expand the scope of a monopoly to cover an additional good or service, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement; 
discriminatory provision includes treating: a. a parent, a subsidiary or other enterprise with common ownership more favorably than an unaffiliated enterprise, or 
b. one class of enterprises more favorably than another, in like circumstances; government monopoly means a monopoly that is owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by the federal government of a Party or by another such monopoly; 
in accordance with commercial considerations means consistent with normal business practices of privately held enterprises in the relevant business or industry;
market means the geographic and commercial market for a good or service; 
monopoly means an entity, including a consortium or government agency, that in any relevant market in the territory of a Party is designated as the sole provider or purchaser of a good or service, but does not include an entity that has been granted an exclusive intellectual property right solely by reason of such grant; 
non-discriminatory treatment means the better of national treatment and most favored nation treatment, as set out in the relevant provisions of this Agreement; and 
state enterprise means, except as set out in Annex 1505, an enterprise owned, or controlled through ownership interests, by a Party. Annex 1505: Country-Specific Definitions of State Enterprises For purposes of Article 1503(3), "state enterprise"; 

1. with respect to Canada, means a Crown corporation within the meaning of the Financial Administration Act (Canada), a Crown corporation within the meaning of any comparable provincial law or equivalent entity that is incorporated under other applicable provincial law; and 
2. with respect to Mexico, does not include, the Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (National Company for Basic Commodities) and its existing affiliates, or any successor enterprise or its affiliates, for purposes of sales of maize, beans and powdered milk. 
^13	  See C.S. Goldman & J.D. Bodrug, eds., Competition Law of Canada (1993).
^14	  See, generally, Charles M. Wright & Matthew D. Baer, Price-Fixing Class Actions: A Canadian Perspective, 16 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 461 (2004) and Charles Stark, Improving Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation, in Competition Policy in the Global Trading System 83 (Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo Matsushita eds., 2002).
^15	  Art. 28, Mexican Const. (1917).
^16	  Ley Organica del Articulo 28 Constitucional en Material de Monopolios, D.O. Aug. 31, 1934.
^17	  Ley Federal de Competencia Econmica, D.O. Dec. 24, 1992.
^18	  See, e.g., the “Schuman Declaration” of May 9, 1950 sparking the creation of the now expired European Coal and Steel Community (1952-2002), precursor to the EEC.
^19	  ABA Section Of Antitrust Law, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE COMPETITION DIMENSIONS OF NAFTA 1 (1994).
^20	  COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTHERN CONE (MERCOSUR)
PROTOCOL OF THE DEFENSE OF COMPETITION The Republic of Argentina, The Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, henceforth designated as the States Parties 
CONSIDERING 
that the free movement of goods and services between the States Parties renders essential that adequate conditions of competition be assured in order to contribute to the strengthening of the Custom Union; 
that States Parties must assure, in the exercise of their economic rights within their territories, equal conditions of free competition; 
that balanced and harmonious growth of intra-zonal trade relations, as well as increased competitiveness among the States Parties will depend in large part upon the consolidation of a competitive environment in the integrated framework of the MERCOSUR; 
that it is urgent that directives be established in order to provide guidance to States Parties and the enterprises situated within them in the defense of competition in the MERCOSUR, as an instrument capable of assuring free market access and a balanced distribution of the benefits of the process of economic integration. 
RESOLVE CHAPTER I
THE PURPOSE AND THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION Article 1. - The purpose of the present Protocol is the defense of competition in the framework of the MERCOSUR. Article 2.- The rules of this Protocol apply to actions taken by natural and legal persons under public and private law, and other entities whose purpose is to influence or to bring influence to bear upon competition in the framework of the MERCOSUR and consequently to influence trade between the States Parties; Single Paragraph - Among the legal entities referred to in the preceding paragraph are included those enterprises which exercise a State monopoly, insofar as the rules of this Protocol do not prevent the regular exercise of their legal attributions. Article 3.- The regulation of the acts carried out within their respective territory by natural persons or legal entities or by any other entity domiciled therein, and whose influence on competition is limited to same, falls within the exclusive competence of each State. CHAPTER II
REGARDING THE RESTRICTIVE CONDUCT AND PRACTICES OF COMPETITION Article 4.- Constitute an infringement of the rules of the present Protocol, regardless of guilt, individual or concerted acts, of whatever kind, the purpose or final effect of which is to restrict, limit, falsify or distort competition or access to the market or which constitute an abuse of a dominant position in the relevant goods or services market in the framework of the MERCOSUR, and which affect trade between the States Parties. Article 5.- Mere market conquest resulting from the natural process of the most efficient economic agent among competitors does not constitute any violation of competition. Article 6.- The following forms of conduct, inter alia, insofar as they embody the hypotheses advanced in article 4, constitute practices which limit competition; I. to fix, impose or practice, directly or indirectly, in collaboration with competitors or individually, in any form, the prices and conditions of the purchase or sale of goods, the providing of services or production; II. to procure or to contribute to the adoption of uniform business practices or concerted action by competitors; III. to regulate goods or service markets, entering into agreements to limit or control research and technological development, the production of goods or the supply of services, or to hinder investments intended for the production of goods or services or their distribution. IV. to divide up the markets of finished or semifinished goods or services, or the supply source of raw materials and intermediate products. V. to limit or prevent access of new enterprises to the market; VI. to agree on prices or advantages which may affect competition in public bids; VII. to adopt, with regard to third parties, unequal conditions for equivalent services, thus placing them at a competitive disadvantage; VIII. to subordinate the sale of one good to the purchase of another good or to the use of a service, or to subordinate the supply of a service to the use of another or to the purchase of a good; IX. to prevent the access of competitors to raw materials, investment goods or technologies, as well as to distribution channels; X. to require or to grant exclusivity with respect to the dissemination of publicity in the communication media; XI. to subordinate buying or selling to the condition of not using or acquiring, selling or supplying goods or services which are produced, processed, distributed or marketed by a third party; XII. to sell merchandise, for reasons unfounded on business practices, at prices below the cost price; XIII. to reject without good reason the sale of goods or the supply of services; XIV. to interrupt or to reduce production on a large scale, without any justifiable cause; XV. to destroy, render useless or accumulate raw materials, intermediate or finished goods, as well as to destroy, render useless or obstruct the functioning of equipment designed to produce, transport or distribute them. XVI. to abandon, cause to be abandoned or destroy crops and plantations without just cause. XVII. to manipulate the market in order to impose prices. CHAPTER III 
ON THE CONTROL OF ACTS AND CONTRACTS Article 7.- The States Parties shall adopt, for the purpose of their incorporation in the regulations of the MERCOSUR, within the period of two years, common rules for the control of acts and contracts, of any kind, which may limit or in any way cause prejudice to free trade, or result in the domination of the relevant regional market of goods and services, including which result in economic concentration, with a view to preventing their possible anti-competitive effects in the framework of the MERCOSUR. CHAPTER IV
ON THE ENFORCEMENT BODIES Article 8.- Application of the present Protocol is applied by the Trade Commission of the MERCOSUR, in accordance with the terms of article 19 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto, and by the Committee for the Defense of Competition. Single Paragraph - The Committee for the Defense of Competition, an organ of intergovernmental nature, shall be constituted by the national organs for the application of the present Protocol in each State Party. Article 9.- The Committee for the Defense of Competition shall submit the rules of procedure of the present Protocol to the Trade Commission for approval; CHAPTER V
ON THE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE Article 10.- The national organs of application shall initiate the procedure provided through the present Protocol ex officio or through reasoned presentation by the legitimately concerned party, which should appear before the Committee for the Defense of Competition and present a preliminary technical evaluation; Article 11.- The Committee for the Defense of Competition, following a preliminary technical analysis, shall initiate an inquiry or, ad referendum of the Trade Commission of MERCOSUR, shelve the case. Article 12.- The Committee for the Defense of Competition shall regularly submit reports on the state of negotiations on the cases under consideration to the Trade Commission of the MERCOSUR. Article 13.- In case of emergency or threat of irreparable damage to competition, the Committee for the Defense of Competition of the MERCOSUR shall determine, ad referendum of the Trade Commission of the MERCOSUR, the application of preventive measures, including the immediate cessation of the practice subject to inquiry, and the reestablishment of the prior situation or other measures which it deems necessary. 1. In case of non observance of the preventive measure, the Committee for the Defense of Competition may define, ad referendum of the Trade Commission of the MERCOSUR, application of a fine of the infringing party. 

2.  Application of the preventive measure or of the fine shall be effected by the national organ of application of the State in the territory of which the defendant is domiciled. Article 14.- The Committee for the Defense of Competition shall establish, in each case investigated, guidelines for the definition of, among other aspects, the relevant market structure, the evidence regarding conduct and analytical criteria of the economic effects of the investigated practice. Article 15.- The national organ of application of the State in the territory of which the defendant is domiciled shall carry out the investigation of the restrictive practice of competition, bearing in mind the guidelines set forth in article 14. 1. The national enforcement bodies undertaking the investigation shall disseminate regular reports on its activities. 
2. The exercise of the right of defense shall be guaranteed to the defendant. Article 16.- The national organs of application of the other States Parties are responsible for assistance to the national enforcement body responsible for the investigation through contribution of information, documentation and other means considered essential to the correct execution of the investigation procedures. Article 17.- In case of differences regarding the application of procedures set forth in this Protocol, the Committee for the Defense of Competition may request MERCOSUR Trade Commission for an opinion on the matter. Article 18.- Once the process of investigation has en concluded the national body responsible for the investigation shall present a conclusive ruling on the matter to the Committee for the Defense of Competition. Article 19.- The Committee for the Defense of Competition, taking into account the ruling of the national enforcement bodies, ad referendum of the Trade Commission of the MERCOSUR, shall decide on the infringing practices and shall establish the sanctions to be imposed or any other appropriate measures. Single Paragraph -If the Committee for the Defense of Competition should not arrive at a consensus, it shall bring its conclusions before the Trade Commission of the MERCOSUR, noting existing differences. Article 20.- The Trade Commission of the MERCOSUR, taking into account the ruling or the conclusions of the Committee for the Defense of Competition, shall make a ruling through adoption of a Directive, setting forth the sanctions to be applied to the infringing party or other appropriate measures. 1. The sanctions shall be applied by the national enforcement bodies of the State Party whose territory the infringing party is domiciled. 
2.  If a consensus were not reached, MERCOSUR Trade Commission shall bring the different proposed solutions before the Common Market Group. Article 21.- The Common Market Group shall make a ruling upon the matter through adoption of a resolution.  Single Paragraph - If the Common Market Group should not arrive at a consensus, the interested State Party could resort directly to the procedure set forth in chapter IV of the Brasilia Protocol on the Settlement of Disputes. CHAPTER VI
UNDERTAKING OF CESSATION Article 22.- At any stage of the procedure, the Committee for the Defense of Competition may ratify, ad referendum of MERCOSUR Trade Commission, an undertaking of cessation of the practice under investigation, which shall not imply a confession as to the facts nor recognition of the illicit nature of the conduct under analysis. Article 23.- The Undertaking of Cessation shall necessarily include the following paragraphs: a) the obligations of the defendant, in the sense of the cessation of the practice being investigated within the established period. 
b) the value of the daily fine to be imposed in case of noncompliance with the Undertaking of Cessation. 
c) the obligation of the defendant to submit regular reports on his activities in the market, keeping the national enforcement bodies informed of eventual changes in the company’s structure, control, activities and location. Article 24.- The procedure shall be suspended when compliance with the Undertaking of Cessation has been reached and will be shelved upon conclusion of the established period, if all the conditions listed in the Undertaking are complied with. Article 25.- The MERCOSUR Committee for the Defense of Competition may ratify modifications of the Undertaking of Cessation if the latter should prove to be an excessive burden for the defendant, and if the new situation should not constitute any infringement of competition. Article 26.- The Undertaking of Cessation, changes in the Undertaking and the sanction referred to in the present Chapter shall be executed by the national enforcement bodies of the State Party in the territory of which the defendant is domiciled. CHAPTER VII
ON SANCTIONS Article 27.- The Committee for the Defense of Competition, ad referendum of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission, shall determine the definitive cessation of the infringing practice within a period of time to be specified. In case of noncompliance with the order of cessation, the daily fine to be determined by the Committee for the Defense of Competition, ad referendum of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission. 
  The order of cessation as well as imposition of the fine shall be executed by the national organ of application of the State Party in the territory of which the infringing party is domiciled. Article 28.- In case of violation of the rules of procedure of the present Protocol the following sanctions shall be applied, either cumulatively or alternatively: I. a fine, based on the earnings obtained from commission of the infringing practice, gross revenues or the assets involved which would be paid to the national enforcement bodies of the State Party in the territory of which the infringing party is domiciled. II. prohibition to participate in the systems of public procurement in any of the States Parties, for a period of time to be determined. III. prohibition to enter into contracts with public financial institutions of any of the States Parties, for a period of time to be determined. The Committee for the Defense of Competition, ad referendum of the Trade Commission of the MERCOSUR, may recommend to the competent authorities of the States Parties that no incentives of any kind or terms of payment of tax obligations be granted to the infringing party. 
  The penalties set forth in this article shall be executed by the national enforcement bodies of the State Party in the territory of which the infringing party is domiciled. Article 29.- As regards the levels of the sanctions established in the present Protocol, the seriousness of the fact of the case and the significance of the damage caused to competition in the framework of the MERCOSUR should be considered. CHAPTER VIII
ON COOPERATION Article 30.- In order to ensure application of the present Protocol, the States Parties shall, through the respective national enforcement bodies, adopt mechanisms of cooperation and of technical consultation, so as: a) to systematize and strengthen cooperation between the national organs and authorities responsible for the perfecting of the national systems and of the joint defense instruments of competition, through a program of the exchange, as well as of the joint investigation of the practices harmful to competition, through a program of exchange of information and experience, of the training of technicians and the accumulation of case law relative to the defense of competition, as well as of the joint investigation of practices harmful to competition in the MERCOSUR. 
b) to identify and mobilize, by means of agreements of technical cooperation in the area of the defense of competition with other States or regional groups, the necessary resources for the implementation of programs of cooperation referred to in the preceding paragraph. CHAPTER IX
ON THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES Article 31.- To the settlement of differences regarding the application, interpretation or nonobservance of the provisions contained in the present Protocol, the provisions of the Protocol of Brasilia and of the General Procedure for Complaints before the Trade Commission of the MERCOSUR set forth in the Annex to the Protocol of Ouro Preto shall applied. CHAPTER X
FINAL AND TRANSITORIAL PROVISIONS Article 32.- The States Parties undertake, within a two year period following entry into force of the present Protocol, and for purposes of their incorporation in this instrument, to draft joint standards and mechanisms which shall govern State aid which is susceptible to limit, restrict, falsify or distort competition and to affect trade between the States Parties. 
To this end, progress made on the subject of public policies which distort competitiveness and the relevant standards of the WTO shall be taken into consideration. Article 33.- The present Protocol, as an integral part of the Treaty of Asuncion, shall enter into force thirty days after the second instrument of ratification has been deposited, with respect to the first two States Parties ratifying it and, in the case of the other signatories, on the thirtieth day after the respective instrument of ratification has been deposited. Article 34.- No provision of the present Protocol shall apply to the restrictive practices of competition the study of which has been initiated by the competent authority of a State Party before the entry into force provided in Article 33. Article 35.- The present Protocol may be revised of common accord, on the proposal of one of the States Parties. Article 36.- Adherence on the part of a State to the Treaty of Asuncion shall imply, ipso iure, adherence to the present Protocol. Article 37.- The Government of the Republic of Paraguay shall be the depository of the present Protocol and of the instruments of ratification, and shall send duly authenticated copies of same to the Governments of the other States Parties. 
Similarly, the Government of the Republic of Paraguay shall notify the Government of the other States Parties of the date of entry into force of the present Protocol, as well as of the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification. 
Done in the city of Fortaleza, on the seventeenth day of the month of December of 1996, in one original in the Spanish and Portuguese languages, both these texts being equally authentic. MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 2/97 Annex to the Protocol For the Protection of Competition In MERCOSUR HAVING SEEN: The Asuncion Treaty, the Ouro Preto Protocol, Decisions No. 21/94 and 18/96 of the Common Market Council, Resolution No. 129/94 of the Common Market Group, and the Minutes of the Twenty-first Meeting of the MERCOSUR Trade Committee, CONSIDERING: 
The importance of establishing criteria for quantifying the amount of fines provided for in the Protocol for the Protection of Competition in MERCOSUR, approved by Decision CMC No. 18/96, The Common Market Council Decides: 
Art. 1 To approve the following Annex to the Protocol for the Protection of Competition in MERCOSUR: "ANNEX TO THE PROTOCOL FOR THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION IN MERCOSUR": 
Art. 1. The fines provided for in the present Protocol shall be equivalent to up to 150% of the profits obtained through the illegal practice; up to 100% of the value of the assets involved; or up to 30% of the value of the company's gross billing for its previous financial year, net of tax. Such fines may not be less than the advantage obtained, if quantifiable. Art. 2 In the specific cases referred to in Articles 13.1, 23.b, and 27.1 of the present Protocol, a daily fine of up to 1% of the company's gross billing for the previous financial period. XII CMC - Asuncion, 18/VI/97 
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^24	  ANDEAN COMMUNITY, DECISION 285: NORMS FOR THE PREVENTION OR CORRECTION OF DISTORTIONS IN COMPETITION CAUSED BY PRACTICES THAT RESTRICT FREE COMPETITION The Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, HAVING SEEN: Chapter VIII of the Cartagena Agreement, Decisions 230, 258 and 281 and Proposal 226/Rev.1 of the Board. CONSIDERING: 
That the Commission approved Decision 230, that contains the norms to prevent or correct practices that could distort competition; 
That the Commission, as set out in Decision 258 and as proposed by the Board, will review the norms on commercial competition; 
That the Commission, as set out in Decision 281, will establish, no later than 31 March 1991, as proposed by the Board, will review the norms on commercial competition established in Decision 230; 
That to obtain the objectives of the integration process it is convenient to perfect the subregional norms on competition, in order to build efficient mechanisms that would allow prevention and correction of distortions arising from business behavior that restricts, impedes, or undermines competition. 
That due to its origin and scope it is necessary to distinguish between the practices considered under this Decision and those practices related to dumping and subsidies, and export restrictions; 
DECIDES: I. Scope of Application Article 1.- The purpose of the norms considered in this Decision is to prevent or correct distortions of competition arising from practices that restrict free competition. Article 2.- Member Countries or companies that have legitimate interest may ask the Board for authorization or mandate to apply measures to prevent or correct imminent damages or damages to production or exports, resulting from practices in the subregion that restrict free competition, or practices of a company that carries on economic activity in a Member Country. 
Practices in the subregion means practices of companies that engage in economic activity in one or more Member Countries. Intervention of a Member Country means a practice linking companies that carry out economic activity in one or more Member Countries and companies located outside the subregion. 
This decision does not include practices undertaken by one or more companies located in a single Member Country that do not have effect in the subregion. These cases are subject to the respective domestic legislation. 
For the purposes of this decision, imminent damage includes appreciable delay in starting production. Article 3.- Practices which restrict free competition are those agreements, parallel actions, or joint practices among companies that produce or could produce the effect of restricting, impeding, or undermining competition. 
The agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall include horizontal or vertical ones entered into between parties linked to the companies. 
For the purposes of this Decision, abusive exploitation of a dominant position in the market by one or more companies shall also be considered an anticompetitive practice. A dominant position by one or more companies exists when they can act independently without regard for competitors, buyers, or providers, due to factors such as a significant participation by the companies in the respective markets, the characteristics of supply and demand of the products, the technological development of he products involved, the access of competitors to sources of funding and supplies, as well as distribution networks. Article 4.- Agreements, parallel actions, or joint practices can consist of: a. improper manipulation or direct or indirect fixing of prices or other market terms, in a discriminatory manner with regard to those prevalent in normal commercial transactions; limitation or control of production, distribution, technical development, or investment. Also, limits or prohibitions on exports, imports, or competition; allocation of the market or supply sources, particularly measures designed to disrupt the normal supply of raw materials; the application in commercial relations of discriminatory conditions for similar services that place some competitors at a disadvantage with regard to others; the making of contracts contingent upon supplementary conditions that by their nature or in accordance with usual business custom have no relation to the purpose of the contracts; and other actions with similar effects. Article 5.- Abuse of a dominant market position means: a. improper manipulation or direct or indirect fixing of prices or other market terms, in a discriminatory manner with regard to those prevalent in normal commercial transactions; limitation or control of production, distribution, technical development, or investment. Also, limits or prohibitions on exports, imports, or competition; unjustified refusal to satisfy demands for the purchase of products, among others, the withholding of inputs from companies in competition for the market of the final product; the application in commercial relations of discriminatory conditions for similar services that place some competitors at a disadvantage with regard to others; the making of contracts contingent upon supplementary conditions that by their nature or in accordance with usual business
custom have no relation to the purpose of the contracts; and f. other actions with similar effects. II. Procedures Article 6.- Requests can be presented by: the Member Countries through their respective liaison organs; and  the company or companies that have legitimate interest, to the extent permitted by domestic legislation. The request shall include the following information: the nature of the restrictive practices and the length of their duration; the characteristics of the products or services involved in the practices; the characteristics of the products affected;  the companies involved; evidence that makes it possible to presume the existence of damage or imminent damage to production or exports from anticompetitive practices; the type of measures requested. 
After receiving the complaint, the Board shall send it to the national liaison organs in the country where the companies involved in the investigation carry out their economic activity. Article 7.- The Board will not begin an investigation if the request is incomplete. In such a case, within ten working days after the presentation of the request, the Board should inform the complainant, giving details of the missing information. 
If the request is considered to be complete, within ten days after the presentation of the request, the Board shall issue a explanatory Resolution. Likewise, the complainant company or companies will be notified of said Resolution. Article 8.- In the course of the investigation, the Junta may request and collect evidence and information from the national agencies and, through them or directly, from the producers, exporters, importers, distributors or consumers who may have legitimate interest in the investigation. Likewise, they may submit information or present allegations to the Junta. 
In the cases in which the Junta requests, collects or receives evidence and information directly, it shall communicate it to the respective national bodies. 

Article 9.- In use of the Junta authority to request and collect evidence, it may give confidential treatment to such an information in regard to the aspects requested by the provider once justified such a treatment on the basis of likely unfavorable consequences. 
Likewise, internal documents elaborated by the Junta or the member countries shall enjoy confidential treatment in regard to the parts of such a nature. 
When pretending to provide confidential treatment to an evidence, the person soliciting it shall provide a brief of the information likely to be divulged or an explanation justifying the reason by which it is not possible to brief it. In the latter case, the Junta may not accept such a justification and disregard such an evidence. 
By the same token, and notwithstanding the request being justified, the Junta may not take the information into consideration if who provided it does not also provide a non-confidential brief of it, if possible. 
The interested parties in the investigation may request by writing the information provided or elaborated during the application of this Decision so long as they do not have confidential character. 
The present article does not restraint the dissemination of general information and, particularly, of the motives on which are based the Resolutions referring the present Decision, so long as they are requested in the course of a judicial proceeding. This dissemination shall not reveal commercial secrets of the parties with legitimate interest in the investigation. Article 10.- In the course of an investigation, the Junta may call ex-officio or at request of the interested parties meetings aimed at procuring a direct settlement whose commitments and findings shall be recorded in a minute. 
No interested party shall be bound to attend a meeting and his absent shall not be in detriment of his cause. 
The Junta shall issue a motivated resolution indicating the commitments reached and, if the investigation is suspended or proceeds at the interested party’s request. 
The firms or authorities of the country where the practice occurs, shall provide the relevant information to verify the fulfilment of the commitments reached. When the commitments do not fulfil or the information is not provided, the Junta shall proceed the investigation. Article 11.- For the investigation, the Board has two months from the date of publication the Resolution referred in Article 7 of this Decision. 
In cases of exception, the period may be extended up to two months in which case the Junta shall notify it to the interested party. Article 12.- In its finding, the Board shall consider the relevant evidence with regard to:  the anticompetitive practices;  the damage or imminent damage; and  the relation of cause and effect between the practices and the damage or imminent damage. Article 13.- The determination of the existence of damage or threat of damage and the relation of cause and effect involving the anticompetitive practices shall be based on the following elements, among others: the volume of trade in the products affected by the practices, particularly in order to determine whether its has changed significantly in absolute terms and in relation to the production and consumption in the affected member country; the prices of the products and services affected by the practices, particularly to determine if they differ substantially from the prices of similar products or services in the absence of the practices; and  the effects on production or exports affected by the practices, according to the real or apparent trends of the pertinent economic factors, such as: production, domestic sales, exports, distribution, market share, utilization of installed capacity, employment, stocks, and benefits. Article 14.- At the conclusion of its investigation, within 10 working days of the time provided in Article 11, the Board shall issue a finding with explanation, setting forth its conclusions on the basis of available information.  The resolution shall indicate the measures adopted, the deadline for their adoption, and their duration. When appropriate, it shall also indicate the conditions that determine the duration of the measures. Article 15.- Once the Junta verifies, at national authorities or parties interested’s request, that the causes that originated the Resolution referred in the above Article modified or ceased, it shall leave it partially or totally without effect, by modifying or abolishing it. For its decision, the Junta shall have two months.  The Junta likewise may verify ex-officio the causes that originated the Resolution modified or ceased, by modifying or abolishing it. III. Measures Article 16.- The Board shall issue an injunction when it determines the existence of an anticompetitive practice that causes damage or imminent damage. It may also decide to apply measures tending to eliminate or alleviate the distortions that gave rise to the complaint. The Member Countries shall adopt the necessary measures to halt the practices. 
The corrective measures may consist of authorization for the countries in which the affected companies carry on their economic activity to apply preferential tariffs with regard to subregional tariff commitments, in cases of imports of products affected by the anticompetitive practice. Article 17.- When the damage or imminent damage is evident, the Board may, in the course of its investigation, make recommendations to cause the practice to cease. IV. Final Provisions Article 18.- This Decision supersedes Decision 230 in those provisions related to preventing or correcting distortions to competition as a result of restrictive practices of competition. 
Signed at Lima, Peru, on March 21, 1991. 
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